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Economic instruments, or market based instruments try to bring market advantages 
to social dilemma situations, where private actions do not lead to socially optimal 
outcomes. Economic instruments try to redress such market failure. They try to 
create incentives for firms and individuals to act in the public interest. Such 
situations can be regarded as ‘social dilemma’. An alternative mechanism to solve 
social dilemma is to use cooperation amongst individuals, by facilitating and utilising 
social capital. The use of social capital is remains largely underexplored as a policy 
option, although this trend is changing, most notably in European rural development. 
Using evidence from research conducted on agricultural and rural institutions in 
central and eastern Europe, where extreme institutional change was caused by 
political shocks to the system, it is argued that policy is best directed at stimulating 
institutional innovation, through social capital formation. There are lessons 
applicable to problems evident in rural New Zealand. 
Keywords: social capital, institutions, governance, central and eastern Europe. Introduction 
The transition from a planned to a market based economy particularly hit the rural 
areas of central and eastern Europe (CEE). The need to intervene in the rural 
economy and buffer the effects of radical institutional change was recognised by the 
European Union for its new member states (EC, 2005). Much of rural development 
requires actors in the countryside to cooperate in order to explore new business 
opportunities. However, it has been shown in the past that very often it was difficult 
for actors to come together for such initiatives (Theesfeld, 2004; Paldam/Svendsen, 
2000), given low levels of trust between individuals, a mistrust of the state – a legacy 
from former communist times, and presumed low levels of social capital in these 
countries. This theoretical frame of this research is in the area of institutional 
economics, constructed as part of a project on Integrated Development of 
Agricultural and Rural Institutions (IDARI)
1.  This paper focuses on empirical 
evidence collected in that project: how groups of individuals decide to act and 
interact, in a situation where cooperation is desirable. Rural areas often suffer from 
diseconomies of scale, as distance and transaction costs can prevent the 
agglomeration effects often evident in urban areas. To overcome this problem, and to 
remain competitive, social capital (the use of networks and personal contacts) 
becomes important. Social capital is understood as the benefits of belonging to a 
network (Bourdieu,1986) or associated with the norms and networks of civil society 
that enable groups of individuals to cooperate for mutual benefit and allow social 
institutions to perform more productively (Putnam, 1995). Trust is a central 
component of social capital, as it determines the strength of these social ties. 
Fukuyama (1995) suggests that trusting societies have a common set of ethical 
principles and internalised norms, conducive to efficient dealings in the economic 
market. A successful example of social capital in operation for market advantage in 
New Zealand is evident in the dairy sector. The dairy farming community has 
developed a set of internalised norms, based on cooperation to retain (international) 
market competitiveness. This has been achieved in a deregulated climate after the 
1984 reforms. Market forces have resulted in this governance structure, with minimal 
state intervention in the agricultural market.  
This paper explores the role of government, market forces and communities in the 
formation of social capital. Encouraging the formation and use of social capital is an 
under-utilised policy option for rural New Zealand. The beneficial aspects of social 
capital were expressed by Serageldin and Grootaert (2000). The first is that 
information is shared and problems due to lacking or insufficient communication are 
alleviated. The second is that activities are coordinated because there are processes 
of interaction and adjustment going on between actors. The third is that collective 
decision making is possible because people trust each other. Thus - and the most 
compelling advantage of utilising social capital in rural areas - public goods can be 
provided and market externalities managed.  
Rural areas within the former communist countries of eastern Europe provide an 
interesting laboratory to explore very dynamic institutional and social processes. In 
                                                            
1 IDARI (Integrated Development of Agricultural and Rural Institutions) was a European 
Commission funded research project under the 5th Framework Programming Quality of Life 
(QLRT-2001- 02718 FP5) CEE the processes of institutional change have resulted from external shocks, 
imposed by political regimes and sudden regime changes over the last sixty years. 
The socialist regimes and centrally planned economies changed the social fabric of 
CEE, and resulted in particular types of behaviour between individuals. Most 
notably, was the effect on interpersonal trust, which resulted in complex trust 
patterns (both high and low levels) between individuals and groups of individuals. 
Within both economic and sociological theory, a person’s institutional endowment is 
acknowledged, and part of that endowment originates in social ties or communities 
of association. This has been termed social capital, and relates to the extent that 
individuals benefit from their personal networks and communities of association 
(Bourdieu, 1986).  
 
Institutional Change in Central and Eastern Europe 
After world war two, the central and eastern European states had communist regimes 
imposed on them. Centrally planned economies changed the social fabric of the 
countries, most notably for the time in the collectivisation of agriculture, changing 
property rights in land ownership. The communist countries experienced a 
paradoxical system, which destroyed trust between people and government, while 
attempting to establish a community based on mutual trust (Lovell, 2001). Official 
hypocrisy, corruption, secret police surveillance and the suppression of meaningful 
citizen participation jeopardised trust, and thus it would seem, leave a legacy, 
hindering cooperation between people. However, particular patterns of behaviour 
emerged between individuals, ranging from strong mistrust of the state, to increased 
trust within close knit networks, families and kinship. The fall of the Berlin wall in 
1989 marked the demise of strong communist control in CEE, with most countries 
gaining independence by 1991. The ‘transition’ period then began, with an overhaul 
of economic institutions in the switch to market economies. A process of reinstating 
private property and markets began, with steep social ‘learning’ in the use of 
economic instruments. Most importantly for rural areas at this time was the 
repatriation of property rights, and each country adopted different methods for 
untangling the web of complexity around their allocation. This coincided with the 
liberalisation of financial and democratic institutions, requiring trust in the state to 
uphold and protect the new property rights. In 2004 and 2007, further institutional 
change took place, with accession of the central and eastern European countries to 
the European Union
2. This was further institutional change, and in preparation the 
countries had to align their economies and financial institutions to the monetary 
targets set by the European Union (EU) and adapt policies to ensure effective 
integration into the European economy and alignment with policy. Of particular 
relevance is the rural development regulation of the EU, which explicitly recognises 
cooperation amongst rural communities as a premise for securing funding. Rural 
development policy advocates the use and creation of social capital in its 
implementation, in the challenge to secure growth and sustainable development in 
rural areas. Evidence of cooperation at a local level is a precursor to securing 
                                                            
2 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia joined the EU in 
2004. Malta and Cyprus also joined the EU at this date, but are Mediterranean state. Romania and 
Bulgaria acceding at the latter date financial support from certain rural development funds. This is a strong policy 
incentive for collective action in rural CEE. 
 
Theoretical frame and methodology 
The research focused on how changes in social capital formation led to institutional 
innovations in a rural context. The theoretical framework utilised was based new 
institutional economic formulations of governance (Murray, 2008), drawing from, 
amongst others, Ostrom’s (2005 and 2000) institutional analytical framework and 
studies on behaviour within collective action. It also drew from the social capital 
literature, which is still characterised by a variety of approaches and definitions. 
Social dilemma refers to situations in which individuals make independent choices in 
an interdependent situation. Each individual has a choice of contributing to a joint 
benefit, or a cooperators’ dividend (Ostrom, 2000).  
 
Figure 1. Framework for analysing cooperation  
 
   RURAL COOPERATION   































  Pillar   Pillar    Pillar 
A   B    C 
Low intervention 
Laissez Faire 
  Medium intervention  High intervention 
State Control 
        
        
Dominance 
        



















        
Land and agricultural 
market development 
Programmes to develop 
territorial communities, using 
incentive led funding 
 Governance  of 
the environment: 
National Parks 
      













  Bulgaria 
Hungary 
  Latvia                       
Lithuania                    
Poland 
  Poland        
Slovakia These notions of cooperation were explored in three different institutional settings, 
using a system of classification that organised the studies into three pillars, each 
representing varying levels of state governance on private property. This is 
particularly important for research in CEE due to the changing role and importance 
of private property in the years of tansition. These settings are defined by the 
dominance of markets, communities and state (Figure 1). It is recognised that each 
category is not mutually exclusive, and indeed it is important to remember that 
markets are groups of individuals (a network) rather than discrete entities in 
themselves (White, 2000; Hurrelmann, 2004). Likewise communities influence 
markets and the state, so this delineation is somewhat fluid. Within the market setting 
a low level of state intervention is assumed, whereby the government upholds 
property rights through arbitration, as the need arises. In the community setting, it is 
assumed there is a certain level of government intervention in property rights insofar 
as the government offers incentive schemes for communities to act collectively. 
Within the state setting, there is a high level of government intervention in terms of 
ownership and rules over resource use. This is in the form of environmental 
regulations within a national park. 
 
Empirical data was collected by researchers in six CEE countries. A popular 
approach in case study research was chosen, which is the use of a multiple-case 
design with replicated cases (Yin, 1994). This allows comparison between cases in 
different settings but with the same underlying situation. The connecting element 
between these cases is the fact that they were all rural development initiatives 
requiring cooperation between stakeholders. Guidelines for the design of the case 
studies were agreed upon by all researchers. All interviews were conducted in the 
vernacular. Seven case studies were completed for this component of the research : 
two in Poland, and one in each of Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Although the institutional environment differs in each country, and indeed within 
regions of the same country, six cross cutting themes were identified for minimum 
comparison of the cases. These were: 
a.  The role of trust/mistrust and opportunism 
b.  The role of communication and learning on cooperation 
c.  The role of transaction costs and changes in governance on cooperation 
d.  The role of the State (both national and European Union) and formal 
institutions on cooperation 
e.  The role of communities, social networks and informal institutions on 
cooperation 
f.  The role of the market and competition in fostering/hindering cooperation 
The first two themes relate to the formation of social capital, and how information is 
transmitted within a network of individuals. The third theme looks at the extent to 
which cooperation is a rational choice, resulting in a reduction in transaction costs 
for the actors involved. The last three themes explore the driving forces of state, 
market and local communities on cooperation, exploring incentives around state 
intervention or lack of (laissez faire market approach) and dynamics of community 
driven initiatives development in rural areas. The following section summarises the 
cases. Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe 
Low state intervention 
Within the market pillar, data was collected from two locations in Hungary and 
Bulgaria. The town of Hajduboszomeny was selected for analysis in Hungary 
(Forgacs, 2005). In former times, agricultural production was organised collectively 
in the form of cooperatives. Despite the fall of the socialist system, not all 
institutions collapsed, and there are examples of continued cooperation within such 
agricultural cooperatives. One such cooperative was studied, and contrasted to a 
newly established (late 1990s) agricultural cooperative in the same town of 
Hajuduboszomeny. The conclusion was that there is potential for successful 
cooperation given the tendency of personal trust to be present. However there was 
little trust in and communication with authorities, and little interaction with other 
actor groups. Thus the issue of leadership was crucial. This finding was interesting as 
most of the literature on social capital does not acknowledge the need for a 
‘mediating agency’ but expects collective action to happen ‘automatically’ where 
enough social capital is present (Hurrelmann et al, 2006). The premise that high 
social capital leads directly to greater political participation is not analytically or 
conceptually clear. In Bulgaria, the selection of the case followed a different logic. It 
was not due to evident cooperation, but where cooperation was required and essential 
for effective market functioning that determined the selection (Aleksiev & Penov, 
2005). The issue of land fragmentation is specific to Bulgaria, due to the inheritance 
laws relating to property. On the death of a property owner, the land is split between 
all offspring. Land was repatriated in the early 1990s, on a retrospective basis, from 
the last deeds prior to collectivisation of the land in the 1940s. These descendents 
had oftentimes left the area, had no identifiable connection with the village/land. 
This led to a situation of absentee landowners and much uncertainty about 
ownership. Fragmented plots are a hindrance to farming systems, and debilitate the 
markets for certain agricultural products, and the land market itself. The plots are not 
necessarily physically discernible, given that fields were consolidated in communist 
times with boundaries removed. The village of Dubene in the Plovdiv region was 
selected, and despite its small size, had 1350 landowners. Limited cooperation within 
the village was identified to overcome the land fragmentation problem, in the form of 
agricultural cooperatives, farmer partnerships and family members working together 
on (extended) family farms. In the attempt to establish the land property market, with 
repatriation of land and systems to reintroduce the basic market premise of property 
rights, the secondary effects were not considered. This is understandable, given the 
complexity of issues and obfuscation around property rights. However planning at 
the policy level could mitigate the adverse effects on the farming systems in place. 
 
Medium state intervention 
Within the community pillar, three case studies were undertaken. The first in the 
Carpathian region of Poland focused on a project attempting to create a place based 
brand for marketing purposes. The Carpathian case looked at cooperation within the 
Bieszczady’s regional identity for food and non-food produce from the area. Limited 
funding was given to coordinate the project. Bieszczady forms a microregion (strong 
self identity), a complexity in the study emerged due to the overlap of administrative 
districts (voivodships) and communes, accompanied by geographical and social isolation of the producers. Despite this, the project was considered a success, as it 
had strong leadership. This can be considered ‘coordinated cooperation’ with central 
importance of the project organisers and leaders, despite little cooperation amongst 
the producers themselves.  
The second case study looked at community led cooperation in rural Lithuania 
(Zemekis, 2005).The ‘PHARE 2000 – Economic and Social Cohesion’ project, 
funded by the European Union provided an incentive for communities to work 
together for a common purpose. The project to create a tourism infrastructure along 
140 km of the Jura river waterway required the statutory agencies (in Taurage 
county) involved in the project to cooperate with one another, although separated 
geographically. The initiative was successful, insofar as it resulted in the formation 
of a network of civil servants, who worked together. The project had limited scope in 
including broader communities, although certain business people were included in 
the project (tourism operators for kayaking on the river). It is important to recognise 
the importance of re-education of CEE officials and bureaucrats in policy 
implementation during institutional transformation. Learning occurs at many levels 
and coordination does not necessarily spontaneously emerge. The case also 
highlighted the problem of identifying communities or groups, which remains 
unresolved in the literature (Khumar, 2005; Agraval and Gibson, 1999) 
The third case study in this community pillar differed from the other two, as it was a 
grassroots, community led initiative, rather than a response to available funding. It 
was similar in the respect that it was a marketing exercise in the tourism industry. 
The Rauna Tourism Association in the Cesis district of Latvia aimed to share 
information and promote the town as a tourism destination (Zobena, Summane and 
Kalnina, 2005). The community were attempting to market their rural resource, and 
realised the mutual benefits could be gained from working together. It also differed 
in that the activity took place in a more limited geographical area than the other two 
cases. There were fewer actors involved in the initiative. The Rauna Tourism 
Association was founded on the initiative of one individual, a farmer who himself 
runs a multifunctional farm business including rural tourism. In the first year of its 
existence, the association received funding from the municipal government, which 
paid for the association’s office and the job of a coordinator. This may have 
contributed to the fact that the actors involved in the Rauna Tourism Association 
expressed a rather high degree of trust in the local municipal government, relative to 
the national government and the European Union. However, the financial 
possibilities of the municipality were limited and while staying generally supportive 
of the initiative, the local government did not continue the funding after the first 
year. The main obstacle to success was identified as a lack of long term vision for the 
organisation, and interest in the organisation was waning, with declining 
membership. Motivation was declining, and the private benefits to individuals were 
not perceived great enough to continue cooperation. Zobena (2005) concluded that 
there was a lack of direction or leadership after the initial formation of the group. 
 
High state intervention 
The third pillar is that with high state intervention. Two cases of a national park 
designation were investigated. These are interesting, as such designations reflect the 
command and control style of governance of former times, in that landowners and resource users within the park bounds are limited in their actions. Rights over 
resource use are defined by the state, for the preservation of nature. The Polish 
Drawinski National Park is situated in the north-west, at the border of three 
administrative regions (Matczak, 2005). The park is relatively new, established in 
1990, fulfilling the requirements of IUCN II category. It is predominantly woodland, 
with some waterway and abandoned fields and meadows. It is valued for its 
biodiversity and recreational value. Although economic opportunities within the area 
are limited, there is contestation over the use of resources, especially commercial and 
farming interests on the outskirts of the park. The second example of state 
intervention is the Slovenski-Raj national park, in the north-east of Slovakia 
(Kluvankova-Oravska, 2005). It has a longer history, as it was protected as a natural 
area in former times (from 1964) and gained national park status in 1988. It is an 
eroded karstic benchland, having picturesque canyons, waterfalls and rivers. As with 
the Drawienski national park, the administration of the park is divided between 
municipalities – adding complexity to its governance. There are problems of finding 
a balance between nature conservation, economic interests (especially tourism and 
farming) and informal user rights (logging) in the park, leading to mistrust and stasis. 
Cooperation is required, by all stakeholders, for sustainable management of the 
parks. These case studies point out that the former regimes, operating on the basis of 
massive state intervention and state monopolies, resulted in a dramatic decline of 
trust in formal authorities and institutions. Furthermore the historical situation has 
meant that there is little resilience in the governance structures of the new 
representatives, and a lack of competencies in governance of the national parks has 
been identified. Conflicting legal provisions were also identified in the governance of 
the parks, making effective management difficult, particularly in the Slovak case.  
Some of the key findings from these case studies were that the legacy from former 
times persisted, leading to a mixed role of trust in the social capital matrix. There 
were examples of cooperative behaviour between actors in rural CEE. Cooperation is 
thus seen as a governance structure – a rational strategy in some instances. The 
integration of the CEE countries into the European Union provided an opportunity to 
analyse the effects of incentive led cooperation. The rural development regulation 
required and encouraged network formation. It became clear that the role of a leader 
in a group was crucial. The presence of social capital did not necessarily result in its 
optimal use for the members of the network, and bridging social capital is important, 
especially between individuals and the authorities. 
  
Discussion 
When attempting to assess whether the ‘time has come’ for economic instruments in 
the New Zealand context, it is of use to examine alternative options. Although no 
parallel can be drawn between rural New Zealand and the former communist 
countries in terms of the historical influence on social norms, both countries have 
experienced economic ‘shocks’ to the system. Neoliberal reform in the 1980s 
exposed the New Zealand farming community to the vagaries and opportunities of 
unbuffered international markets. From the 1990s onwards, the central and eastern 
European countries were exposed to market forces, after fifty years of a command 
and control approach to the economy. Low levels of social capital were identified in central and eastern European countries, alongside persistent mistrust of the state. 
Despite this, cooperation is evident as is collective action for solving social dilemma.  
Rural New Zealand does not have such a handicap in its social fabric. There is active 
social capital processes evident in activities undertaken around educational centres 
(schools and pre-schools), in farm discussion groups, in the informal institutions (for 
example A&P shows, livestock yards and social clubs to name but a few).  
The issue is how strong interpersonal trust among motivated, well educated and well 
connected leaders of rural communities in New Zealand can be harnessed in a more 
productive manner. Perhaps an obstacle which needs to be overcome is the gap 
between local people and authorities. A second obstacle to successful cooperation is 
if the (perceived) benefits for cooperation are not clear to individuals. This is perhaps 
the role of local leaders, to provide credible information making clear the 
expectations of participating in groups and networks.  
In Europe there is a trend toward harnessing the existing social capital in rural areas, 
encouraging cooperation and collective action amongst actors. After the initial 
transition phase in central and eastern European countries, the European Union 
provided guidance and policy for agricultural and rural development. The current 
trend in European policy has been described by Osti (2000) as an attempt to 
substitute hierarchical intervention with a system characterised by network and 
market relationships. The benefits of shared information (reduction in transaction 
costs), coordinated activities and collective decision making are the rewards for 
mobilising and utilising social capital. 
There is an underutilised resource of social capital in New Zealand. The presence of 
a resource does not necessarily mean it is used effectively. It can remain untapped. 
The case studies in this paper showed that despite a perceived handicap in the 
existence of the resource of social capital itself, policy can provide incentives for its 
mobilisation. This can provide an alternative to the use of economic instruments, 
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